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Abstract.  The  form  and  regulation  of  contracts  is  of  increasing  importance  to  agricultural 
economists as farmers and agribusinesses increasing rely on contracts rather than markets to 
acquire inputs and sell outputs.  We focus on the differences between the joint and individual 
surplus achievable under complete versus incomplete or relational contracts, where the latter are 
contracts that are not verifiable by a third party and must rely upon threat of termination in order 
to entice mutually satisfactory performance.  Using an experimental market similar to Brown, 
Falk, and Fehr [Brown, M., A. Falk, and E. Fehr. “Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market 
Interactions, Econometrica, 72 (2004):747-780] we replicate the general results found by these 
authors, including the qualitative findings that complete contracts dominate incomplete contracts 
in terms of social surplus generated and that incomplete contracts significantly deviate from the 
minimal levels of social surplus predicted by equilibrium models featuring purely self-interested 
agents.  We extend the Brown, Falk, and Fehr results in a fundamental way: we explicitly link 
individual outcomes in relational contracts (e.g, surplus, prices, quality) to the nature of subjects’ 
social  preferences,  which  were  measured  by  a  separate  experimental  protocol  that  was 
implemented prior to the experimental trading session.  We find subjects with other-regarding 
preferences enter into relational contracts that generate levels of social surplus similar to the 
surplus  generated  under  complete  contracts.    Furthermore,  subjects  with  other-regarding 
preferences  tend  to  locate  others  with  similar  preferences  and  enter  into  long-term  trading 
relationships  that  generate  these  higher  surplus  levels.    We  discuss  the  ramifications  of  the 
results for current regulatory efforts aimed at agricultural contracts. 
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Social Preferences and Relational Contracting: An Experimental Investigation 
 
The form and regulation of contracts is of increasing importance to agricultural economists as 
farmers and agribusinesses increasing rely on contracts rather than markets to acquire inputs and 
sell  outputs.    Contracts  can  range  from  agreements  that  address  nearly  all  contingencies 
(complete  contracts)  to  simple,  open-ended,  informal  agreements  (incomplete  or  relational 
contracts – we shall use these terms interchangeable throughout).  Relational contracts (Levin) 
are  increasingly  recognized  as  important  trade  mechanisms  as  many  real-world  incentive 
schemes reward aspects of performance that are difficult for third parties (e.g., courts) to verify.  
In the absence of third-party verification and enforcement, such contracts must be self-enforcing, 
i.e.,  rely  upon  both  parties’  threat  of  contract  termination  to  entice  mutually  satisfactory 
performance.   
  In some cases, contracting partners strategically choose to omit contingencies (i.e., choose 
relational to complete contracts) to maintain flexibility (Bernheim and Whinston), and in other 
cases relational contracts are the only alternative because third-party verification is noisy or non-
existent.  For example, processors in some livestock sectors weigh the animals themselves and 
determine  mortality  rates  without  a  third  party  present,  which  has  led  to  allegations  that 
processors engage in opportunistic behavior (Hamilton 1995).   
  Even when performance is verifiable, real world contracts often contain implicit components 
that are inherently unverifiable.  For example, some agricultural contracts may precisely define 
performance (e.g. feed conversion ratio) and provide for third-party verification, but may omit 
the agreement’s length, contract renewal provisions, or determinants of future contract payments.  
Future  contract  terms  might  be  based  on  unverifiable  factors  such  as  a  grower’s  degree  of 
cooperation  with  a  processor  or  the  willingness  of  a  grower  to  upgrade  her  facilities  at  the   Do Not Cite Without Permission 
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processors request.  Indeed, recent legislation (e.g., the Producer Protection Act of 2000 initiated 
by the Iowa Attorney General) addresses the issue of contract renewal or termination, implying 
that policy makers understand that contracts are often less “complete” than they appear.   
  Standard  theory  predicts  contracts  that  lack  third-party  enforceability  provide  weaker 
incentives than complete contracts and may skew the distribution of benefits towards one party.  
Therefore, the use of complete contracts should lower the necessity of costly ex post bargaining 
or legal remedies.  Thus, the study of relational contracts, which contain both explicit (legally 
enforceable)  and  implicit  (not  verifiable)  components,  becomes  an  increasingly  important 
research agenda for agricultural economists. 
  Furthermore, because standard theory predicts that incomplete contracts dominate complete 
contracts, it may provide a rationale for government intervention in relational contracts in the 
same  way  that  market  failures  often  justify  market  regulation.    However,  economists  have 
recently begun to explore the impact of social preferences (e.g. reciprocity, fairness, altruism; 
see Fehr and Fischbacher for an overview) on trading outcomes.  When economic agents display 
social preferences that deviate from standard assumptions of self-interest, it is possible that the 
efficiency gap between complete and relational contracts will be narrower than theory predicts 
and, furthermore, the imposition of increased regulation may ‘crowd out’ implicit forces such as 
reciprocity that can make relational contracts achieve high degrees of efficiency.  Indeed, a better 
understanding of the impact of social preferences on economic outcomes can provide insights 
into positive questions about how social preferences influence trade, and normative questions 
such as how the government ought to intervene in contracting relationships  
  In this paper we investigate several questions surrounding relational contracts, including:     Do Not Cite Without Permission 
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(1) Do  relational  contracts  result  in  lower  productivity  and  generate  less  surplus  than 
complete contracts?   
(2) How does the distribution of surplus differ by contracting regime?  
(3) How do the answers to the previous two questions depend upon the social preferences of 
participants?   
(4) How do subjects with heterogeneous social preferences interact; that is, to what extent are 
they able to form long-term relationships, which require trust and cooperation. 
  To address these questions and to forward the growing discussion concerning the structure, 
efficiency and regulation of contracts in agricultural markets, we fit a bilateral contracting model 
to data generated from a series of economic experiments in which subjects endogenously form 
contractual partnerships over a finite time horizon via a computerized network with no face-to-
face  interaction.    The  experimental  marketplace  features:  more  sellers  (agents)  than  buyers 
(principals); sellers with a positive reservation wage; the ability for parties to track the reputation 
of  other  parties  with  whom  they  interact;  and  costly  quality  provision  by  sellers.    Subjects 
participate in two 15-period sessions per experiment.  The experiment features a two-tier design 
where the type of contract (complete vs. incomplete) is randomly assigned across groups.   
  Our experimental setup is very similar to that of Brown, Falk, and Fehr (BFF).  In addition, 
individual-specific  social  preferences  are  measured  prior  to  the  experiment  using  a  series  of 
Charness-Rabin tests.  To date 36 university student subjects have participated in the protocol 
and have generated data on more than 400 individual trades (48 more subjects are scheduled to 
participate prior to the presentation of this paper and will be added to all results).  Standard 
economic experimental practices were followed for all aspects of the experiment (Friedman and 
Sunder).     Do Not Cite Without Permission 
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  Our evidence is consistent with previous findings by BFF, namely that relational contracts 
are less efficient than complete contracts in terms of productivity (quality) and social surplus.  In 
addition, like BFF, we find that, under complete contracts, surplus is less evenly distributed 
between principals and agents with the short side of the market (principals) capturing most of the 
surplus.  However, when different groups of subjects as delineated by their social preference 
indices  are  examined,  we  find  the  nature  of  individual  subjects’  social  preferences  have  a 
statistically and economically significant impact on the terms of trade that emerge under the 
relational contracting regime. 
  The remainder of the paper is as follows.  First, we review several strands of literature that 
relate  to  the  current  paper.    We  then  develop  the  underlying  bilateral  model  used  to  derive 
theoretical  predictions  and  to  structure  the  experimental  market.    Next,  details  of  the 




  This proposal builds upon the literature of incomplete and relational contracts, informal 
enforcement mechanisms (e.g. cooperation, reciprocal behavior, trust, etc.) and social norms.  A 
standard prediction made by economists is that incomplete contracts are less effective at 
providing performance incentives relative to complete contracts (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian; 
Holmstrom and Tirole; Hart and Moore).  A contract can be unenforceable for a number of 
reasons, e.g., weak legal institutions, informal or sloppily written contracts, contracts based on 
performance measures that cannot be verified, etc.     Do Not Cite Without Permission 
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  Recent experimental evidence has led economists to moderate their assessments of the 
inefficiency of incomplete contracts.  Experimental research has shown that incomplete contracts 
can be more efficient than first thought because informal enforcement mechanisms may exist to 
govern trade and exchange.  Brown, Falk and Fehr conducted several experiments which showed 
that, even in the absence of formal enforcement, informal enforcement mechanisms, such as trust 
and concern for reputation, will emerge to protect the integrity of trade.  A number of other 
experimental studies have also been conducted illustrating the impact of implicit incentives on 
the efficiency of trade even when contracts are incomplete (e.g. Fehr, Gachter and Kirchsteiger; 
Fehr and Gachter provide an extensive survey).  Both Brown, Falk and Fehr and Lazzarini, 
Miller and Zenger find that reputation formation is necessary in order for social preferences to 
improve social surplus under relational contracts, however.  In the absence of individual 
reputation tracking it is clearly socially advantageous (and privately advantageous for the short 
side of the market) to operate in a regime with complete contracting.   
  The presence and measurement of social preferences is also an emerging field of interest 
in economics.  While some economists have eschewed the study of individual preferences that 
deviate from pure self-interest, the emerging wisdom concerning preferences for things such as 
fairness, revenge or altruism was nicely summarize by Matthew Rabin in his Alfred Marshall 
Memorial Lecture to the European Economics Association: “. . . the mere fact that the taste for 
revenge and fairness is finite, and diminishes when it is more costly to purchase, makes it like 
every single other taste economists study, not something to be dismissed,” (2002, pg. 685).  
Several formal models of preferences that incorporate the well-being of others have been 
developed, including models of fairness (Bolton and Ockenfels; Fehr and Schmidt), models of   Do Not Cite Without Permission 
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reciprocity (Rabin 1993, Levine), and models that encompass several potentially competing 
explanations of other-regarding behavior (Charness and Haruvy).   
  Numerous experimental approaches exist for testing the nature and strength of social 
preferences.  Typically two subjects are anonymously matched and money split between them 
according to a set of rules that may allow one player to make a choice about the allocation of 
funds (i.e., dictator games, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler), one player to allocate funds with the 
second player merely able to accept or veto the allocation (i.e., ultimatum games, Guth, 
Schmittberger and Schwarze), or for transfers to occur back and forth between subjects at 
various rates of exchange (e.g., gift-exchange games, Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Reidl).  We rely 
upon a set of dictator and exchange games used by Charness and Rabin to determine the social 
preference structure of the subjects involved in our study.  The set of games employed by 
Charness and Rabin allow for discrimination across several competing types of other-regarding 




The empirical testing of contract and incentive theory has posed some unique challenges to 
economists.  First, data is difficult to obtain because firms are often reluctant to share detailed 
information about contract terms.  Second, even when data is available, it may not be detailed 
enough to supply the researcher with a sufficient set of control variables as performance and 
contract structure may be heavily influenced by unwritten rules, expectations, and other social 
norms that are not measurable.   
  The use of an experimental approach allows the researcher to control the trading environment 
and randomly assign subjects to different treatment groups.  This vastly improves the   Do Not Cite Without Permission 
  7 
researcher’s ability to isolate and estimate the effect of individual items and allows for causal 
inferences.  While not without its critics, experimental economics has gained great popularity 
because of its flexibility to study theoretical constructs that elude analysis of real world data and 
to study empirical issues in real-world markets that lack sufficient visibility or variation (see Roe 
and Randall for a summary experimental methods used in economics and agricultural economics 
and the profession’s critiques of such approaches).  The acceptance of experimental studies in all 
major economics and field journals is a testament to its usefulness to the profession.   
   Experimental Approach: Standard economic experimental protocol is followed for all stages 
of the experiments (see Friedman and Sunder) unless otherwise specified.  All experiments are 
implemented using a networked computer lab where individual computers are separated by 
screens to prevent subjects from viewing other subjects’ activity.  We used Z-Tree: The Zurich 
Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments, Version 2.1 (Fischbacher 1999) to create the 
experimental interface and program specific treatments (see Figure 1 for an example). 
 
 
Figure 1.  Screen shot of trading environment from Z-TREE contract trading session. 
 
   
  Experimental Subjects.  Thirty-six students were recruited by e-mail from the various 
departments throughout Ohio State University and through paid advertisements in campus 
newspapers.  Recruitment materials described the general premise of the activity; promised a   Do Not Cite Without Permission 
  8 
minimum fee of $5 for merely attending; announced the distribution of additional payments that 
could be earned from participation; and informed recruits that actual returns will depend upon 
the rules of the game and the participant’s and other participants’ actions.  Upon arrival 
participants registered, signed consent forms, and were seated in the computer lab.  
  Experimental Flow and Design.  Experimental sessions proceeded as outlined in Table 1.  
After arrival, subjects participated in a set Charness-Rabin (CR) tests.  The Charness and Rabin 
protocol pairs subjects together and then requires each subject in a pairing to make decisions that 
will affect the monetary payoffs of both subjects.  Each game provides subjects with 
opportunities to forgo payment such that the payment of the other subject is altered – sometimes 
for the better and other times for the worse.  By having each subject participate in a sequence of 
games with minor variations in roles and possible outcomes, various social preferences, 
including reciprocity, can be identified.   
 
Table 1: Experimental Session Flow 
After completing the CR tests, subjects 
participated in a session of an 
experimental economy where buyers 
and sellers interact in various forms of 
complete and incomplete contracts.  The exact form and design of these sessions will be detailed 
below.  Next, subjects participate in a variation of the CR tests.  A second contracting session 
was then implemented followed by the administration of a demographic questionnaire.  Finally, 
subjects are paid and dismissed.   
  As is commonly done in experimental settings (Friedman and Sunder, pg. 51), one 
experimental market session and one set of the social preference games are chosen to be the 
1.  Arrival, consent forms, seating  10 minutes 
2.  Social preference session 1  15 minutes 
3.   Contracting session 1  40 minutes 
4.   Social preference session 2  15 minutes 
5.   Contracting session 2  35 minutes 
6.   Demographics, payment, dismissal  10 minutes   Do Not Cite Without Permission 
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‘paying’ session via a random process observed by the subjects (rolling dice).  Subjects are fully 
informed of this compensation tactic at the beginning of the experiment.  This minimizes 
potential wealth effects associated with paying all sessions and increases monetary incentives 
during each session. 
  The contractual economy is based on the design of Brown, Falk, and Fehr.  All trade is 
conducted via bilateral contracts.  Subjects are randomly partitioned into two groups: buyers and 
sellers.  Buyers offer “contracts” to sellers specifying a price-quality combination for a unit of an 
abstract good.  Sellers can accept or reject these offers.  Round-specific payouts are determined 
for buyers as follows: 




occurs    trade no   if    0
  occurs    trade if    10 P Q
 
where pb is the buyer’s payment, Q is the agreed upon quality level, and P is the agreed upon 
payment.  The seller’s profit is: 




occurs    trade no   if r   
  occurs    trade if    ) (Q c P
 
where c(Q) is a cost function that is strictly increasing and convex in quality and r is a 
reservation earnings in the absence of trade.   
  At the end of each round within a contracting session, each subject is informed of the payoff 
for each subject (buyer and seller) involved in the transaction.  Each contracting session is 
comprised of 2 practice rounds and 15 rounds that may determine eventual cash payment.  All 
rounds feature the same type of contract (e.g., a complete contract) and the same contract type 
will not be repeated across contracting sessions within the same experiment.   
  Two different contract types are explored.  In the complete contract treatment (C), sellers 
must supply the agreed upon quality; that is, quality is enforceable.  In the incomplete   Do Not Cite Without Permission 
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contracting session (IC), if sellers agree to these offers, they do not necessarily have to supply 
the quality specified in the contract; in other words, quality is unenforceable.     
  In all treatments reputation formation is possible.  Specifically, each subject will be told of 
the other party’s identification number and will be allowed to record this information on a 
separate sheet of paper and each party maintains the same identification number for the entirety 
of the 15-round session.  Identification numbers are re-assigned between 15-round sessions to 
eliminate any carry-over between sessions.     
  Each subject participates in two contracting session during one experiment, which means that 
order effects might arise.  Hence, the order of complete and incomplete contracting sessions in 
switched between experiments. 
  In addition, Brown, Falk, and Fehr have graciously provided Wu with a module programmed 
in Z-TREE (Fischbacher) that can be used as a base for implementing the specific requirements 
of the proposed experimental design (see Figure 1 for a screen shot of the trading environment).   
 
Models 
In order to generate experimental predictions and testable hypotheses, we begin with the model 
of Brown, Falk and Fehr.  In addition, we draw from the insights of standard contract theory to 
generate additional qualitative predictions in our experiments.    
  The Brown, Falk, and Fehr model involves a principal (buyer) who trades with a seller for a 
single commodity with varying quality levels.  The principal offers a contract to the seller where 
the contract specifies a desired quality level, Q, and a payment P.   If the seller accepts the 
contract, it must subsequently choose the quality level it must supply.  Once quality is chosen, 
payoffs are determined in accordance with equations (1) and (2) specified earlier.     Do Not Cite Without Permission 
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  In order to generate specific numeric predictions, we must adopt a specific functional form 
for the quality cost function c(Q).  We use the cost table of Brown, Falk, and Fehr, which is: 
 
Table 2: Quality Production Costs 
Quality  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Cost  0  1  2  4  6  8  10  12  15  18 
 
Thus, quality is an integer bounded between 1 and 10.  Price is also restricted to belong to the set 
of integers from 0 to 100.  The reservation earnings, r, is set equal to 5.   
  Brown, Falk and Fehr used this model to generate numeric predictions for C and IC sessions.  
Under C, quality specified in an agreement is enforceable and therefore the seller must supply 
the quality specified in the contract.  Thus, the principal’s profit maximizing contract choice 
determined by solving the problem: 
(3)   ( )
, max 10
Q P Q P -     s.t.   ( ) 5 P c Q - ³  
Assuming that the constraint holds with equality (which must be true for a profit maximizing 
principal), solving for P, and substituting into the objective function yields: 
(4)   ( ) max 10 5 ( )
Q Q c Q - -  
which yields the first order condition: 
(5)   10 ( ) 0 c Q ¢ - =  
  However, one can see from the cost table that marginal cost never exceeds three so that the 
principal chooses the implement the maximum quality level Q* = 10.  With Q* in hand, it is easy 
to solve for P* = 23 using the participation constraint to ensure that the seller will accept the 
contract.  In our economy with five principals and seven sellers, in equilibrium, five trades take 
place in any given round and joint surplus per trade is given by: 
(6)   5
C
b s S p p = + - = 77.   Do Not Cite Without Permission 
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  Under IC, quality is no longer enforceable so that the seller has the discretion to deviate from 
the quality level specified in the contract.  To evaluate the equilibrium outcome, first consider 
what the seller would do given a fixed payment, P.  Note from her objective function (2) that 
profit is maximized when Q = 1 so that production cost is zero.  Hence, equilibrium effort is:  
Q
IC = 1.  The principal, anticipating that the buyer will deviate from any agreement that specifies 
Q > 1, will offer only a minimal payment to ensure participation; that is P
IC = 5.  In equilibrium, 
five trades take place and joint surplus is given by S
IC = 5 because the seller earns no surplus 
above reservation earnings and the principal earns profits of 5.  Thus, the unenforceability of 
efforts leads to substantially lower joint surplus and quality level.   
  Table 3 summarizes the numeric predictions under each of the treatments. 
 
Table 3: Equilibrium Predictions by Treatment (5 buyers and 7 sellers) 
  Q  P 
b p   s p   Surplus  # of trades 
Complete (C)  10  23  77  0  77  5 
Incomplete (IC)  1  5  5  0  5  5 
 
 
These predictions allow us to formulate several hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: When quality is unenforceable so that contracts are incomplete (IC):  
  a) Equilibrium quality will be lower than the case when quality is enforceable (C).   
  b) Total surplus will be lower than the case when quality is enforceable (C). 
Hypothesis 2:  Whether quality is enforceable or not, all surplus goes to the principal.   
   
  The above hypotheses follow from the equilibrium predictions of Table 3.  However, these 
predictions are based on the assumption that all subjects are rational and make decisions in their 
own self-interest and that there is no role for reputation formation.  In addition, because there are   Do Not Cite Without Permission 
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a finite number of rounds, the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of a finitely repeated game is 
for the subjects to repeat the stage game Nash equilibrium.  Therefore, the predictions in Table 3 
should hold across all rounds in the experiment.  
  Nonetheless, recent developments in contract theory have shown that it is possible for people 
to deviate from the rational outcomes so that incomplete contracts may be more efficient than 
canonical predictions.  Fehr and Schmidt suggest that if enough subjects have social preferences 
that are not strictly selfish, then subjects may voluntarily enforce agreements even when it is 
costly for them to do so.  In other words, if there are a sufficient number of subjects who have a 
social preference for fairness and are willing to retaliate against hostile actions or reward friendly 
actions even if it is costly to do so, then it’s possible for Q >1 to prevail in IC.  Thus, if there are 
enough “reciprocal” types in the economy, quality and social surplus may be enhanced even 
when contracts are incomplete.  
  Indeed, economists have confirmed that some subjects do behave reciprocally or exhibit 
other-regarding preferences in experimental settings (e.g. Roth; Fehr and Gachter; Charness and 
Rabin; and Camerer).  The intuition is that if an other-regarding principal receives a generous 
quality outcome from an agent, the principal will respond with a generous payment.  Similarly, if 
an other-regarding agent receives a generous initial contract offer from the principal and it is 
known that many principals have a social preference for fairness, then the agent may respond 
with a generous quality.  In essence, with enough other-regarding types in the economy and if it 
is common knowledge that these types exist, then high quality and surplus can be sustained in 
equilibrium even under IC.  This leads to our next hypothesis: 
   Do Not Cite Without Permission 
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Hypothesis 3: When there are enough other-regarding types in a trading cohort and 
reputation can be tracked (R), it is possible for Q > 1, P > 5 and surplus to exceed 5 under 
IC.  
 
  A key part of our experiment is to identify the proportion of other-regarding types in our 
subject population.  By using the simple tests designed by Charness and Rabin, we can determine 
subjects’ social preferences and test how the proportion of reciprocal types might be affected 
performance under IC.  This will enable us to test another hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Equilibrium Q, P, surplus, and trades should be increasing in the proportion of 
reciprocal types in the subject pool. 
 
  Hypothesis 4 allows us to explore an important emerging question in the economics 




  The top panel of Table 4 contains the summary statistics of the 443 trades completed to date 
(600 more trades are scheduled to be completed prior to March 1, 2005 and will be appended to 
subsequent drafts of this document).  For complete and incomplete treatments, 225 trades were 
possible and expected under equilibrium predictions (Table 3), meaning that in only five and two 
cases, respectively, did trades not occur.  Hence, equilibrium predictions concerning the level of 
trade activity are met.   Do Not Cite Without Permission 
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Table 4. Trading Results  














































































A- For numbers within the same column featuring this superscript, we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis  of  no  difference  to  the  complete  contract  treatment  (C)  at  all  normal  levels  of 
significance. 
B – Standard deviations in parentheses. 
C – Seller rent observed for incomplete contracts was not statistically different at the 10 percent 
level for trades involving self-regarding versus other regarding sellers. 
 
 
  Comparing resulting levels of quality, surplus, buyer’s rent and seller’s rent (top panel, Table 
4) to equilibrium predictions in Table 3 yields a formal rejection of the equivalence of observed 
levels to equilibrium level for each category of measurement and for both treatments.  However, 
qualitative  predictions  surrounding  the  relative  magnitudes  of  these  five  outcomes  between 
complete  and  incomplete  treatments  are  upheld  in  three  cases.    Specifically,  quality,  total 
surplus, buyer’s rent are significantly higher under the complete than incomplete contracting 
treatment.   
  According  to  equilibrium  predictions,  the  seller’s  rent  would  be  no  different  between 
complete and incomplete treatments, with both scenarios providing zero seller rents.  However, 
from the observed trades, seller rent was significantly larger than zero in both instances and   Do Not Cite Without Permission 
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significantly larger under the incomplete than the complete treatment at all practical levels of 
statistical significance.  Also, equilibrium predictions call for a higher price under complete than 
incomplete  contracts,  while  the  observed  complete  and  incomplete  contract  prices  were  no 
different from one another and both significantly higher than the predicted price. 
  While Brown, Falk and Fehr (BFF) do not report raw averages and standard deviations for 
any of their data, they do plot round-by-round results concerning average quality and price.  Our 
results for the complete contracting treatment appear similar in absolute values to those found by 
BFF, while our results for the incomplete contracts are somewhat lower in absolute terms.  This 
implies that our results concerning the relative magnitudes of quality and price under complete 
vs. incomplete contracting follow those found by BFF and provide convergent validity of our 
experimental results collected to date. 
 
Social Preferences 
  Brown, Falk and  Fehr  argue that agents with  other-regarding preference  can lead results 
observed  under  incomplete  contracting  to  deviate  from  predictions  derived  from  equilibrium 
models  feature  purely  self-interested  agents  and  claim  that  their  observed  deviations  from 
equilibrium predictions support the notion that subjects with other-regarding preferences affect 
incomplete contracting results.  If their conjecture is true, then one would expect that the results 
of individual trades by subjects with other-regarding preferences would differ from those with 
purely  self-regarding  preferences  in  terms  of  prices  offered,  quality  observed  and  surplus 
achieved.  To the best of our knowledge, our experimental protocol allows for the first direct test 
of this conjecture.   Do Not Cite Without Permission 
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  To measure the nature and intensity of subject’s social preferences, we had each subject 
participate in the four Charness-Rabin games summarized in Table 5.  Six choices were used to 
create an index of self-regarding preferences; players who made at least half of their choices in a 
manner consistent with someone who exhibits purely self-regarding preferences and believes all 
other subjects exhibit purely self-regarding preferences are categorized as self-regarding (SR) 
types while all others will be categorized as other-regarding (OR) types. 
 
Table 5.  Charness-Rabin Social Preference Games Used. 
Game Structures
A  Self-Regarding Index
B 
A – No Choice 
B – (400, 400) vs. (750, 375) 
A – Not applicable 
B – Choose (400, 400) 
A – (100, 1000) vs. let B choose 
B – (75, 125) vs. (150, 125) 
A – Let B choose 
B – Not applicable 
A – (700, 200) vs. let B choose 
B – (200, 700) vs. (600, 600) 
A – Choose (700, 200) 
B – Choose (200, 700) 
A – (375, 1000) vs. let B choose 
B – (400, 400) vs. (350, 350) 
A – Let B choose 
B – Choose (400, 400) 
A – Player A always moves first.  Values in parentheses indicate (player A payment in cents, 
player  B  payment  in  cents).    All  subjects  matched  anonymously  with  no  repeated  pairings.  
Player B makes decision prior to learning player A’s decision.  All subjects play each game 
twice, once as player A and once as player B. 
B – Indicates a choice that results in the addition of a single point to the subject’s self-regarding 
index, which implicitly assumes that the subject believes his/her anonymous partner holds purely 
self-regarding preferences. 
 
  The characteristics of trades made by pairs involving SR and OR buyers in the incomplete 
contracting treatments are quantified in the top two rows of the bottom panel of Table 4.  All five 
summary statistics are significantly different between the two groups at the one percent level of 
significance  or  lower.    Specifically,  when  the  buyer  (principal)  has  OR  preferences,  price, 
quality,  total  surplus,  buyer’s  rent  and  seller’s  rent  are  all  significantly  higher  than  trades 
initiated by buyers with SR preferences.  Quality, price and buyer’s rent are more than double 
when the buyer has OR rather than SR preferences while seller’s rent in more than 50 percent   Do Not Cite Without Permission 
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higher.  This provides strong direct evidence that the presence of subjects with other-regarding 
preferences drives Brown, Falk and Fehr’s results, as we connect the dots between individual 
buyers with other-regarding preferences and observed levels of price, quality and surplus than 
those buyers with self-regarding preferences. 
  The role of the seller’s social preferences is also isolated in the bottom two rows of the 
bottom panel in Table 4.  The qualitative results are similar to the differences observed between 
OR and SR buyers though the severity of differences is muted.  Trades featuring sellers with OR 
preferences feature prices, quality, total surplus and buyer rent that is significantly larger than 
those obtained in trades featuring sellers with SR preferences.   
  However, seller’s rent is no different between the two groups.  This implies that sellers with 
other regarding preferences do no better themselves because of the nature of their preferences, 
but do provide a benefit to the buyer and society (via greater quality).  Compare this to the 
comparison  between  buyer  types:  buyers  with  OR  preferences  tended  to  do  better  both  for 
themselves and for the seller and society.  This suggests that the social preferences held by those 
on the short side of the market (the buyer in this case) will have a larger impact on the benefits 
achieved during the trade than the preferences of those on the short side of the market.   
  Note, however, that in  our set up the relative  bargaining power of the two sides is also 
confounded  with  the  order  trading,  i.e.,  buyers  make  offers  before  sellers  react.    Scenarios 
featuring the long side of the market acting first would be needed to determine if OR preferences 
drive  better  trading  outcomes  due  to  relative  bargaining  power  or  order  of  trading  or  some 
combination of the two factors. 
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Length of Contractual Relationships 
  The mechanism that allows for subjects with other regarding preferences to obtain outcomes 
beyond  equilibrium  predictions  generated  under  the  assumption  of  purely  self-regarding 
preferences is that of reputation formation, which by its nature is a dynamic phenomenon.  The 
market in which the subjects participate is realistic in that buyers may search for a seller via two 
avenues: public offers or private offers.  Public offers are posted such that all sellers could view 
the proposed wage and quality combination with the first to respond to the offer allowed to 
participate  in  the  trade.    Private  offers  are  posted  such  that  only  one  seller  of  the  buyer’s 
choosing could view and respond to an offer.  Buyers and seller could conclude a maximum of 
one transaction per period; given the imbalance of buyers and sellers, this implies that at least 
two sellers would engage in no trade and merely receive their reservation wage in each period. 
  We find that complete and incomplete contracts feature a similar, high level of reliance upon 
public  offers  during  the  initial  periods  of  trading  within  a  session.    As  trading  progresses, 
subjects  in  the  incomplete  treatment  migrate  to  a  greater  reliance  upon  private  offers  while 
subjects in the complete contracting treatments maintained a heavy reliance upon public offers 
for all rounds of trading.  Specifically, the fraction of subsequent trades by a buyer that involves 
a different seller (called the separation rate) was 0.70 for incomplete contracts and 0.81 for 
complete contracts, which is significantly different at the one percent level.  These results mirror 
those of Brown, Falk and Fehr.   
  Our contribution is to identify how the social preferences of the subjects impacts nature of 
the trading relationships that endogenously arise during the course of a 15-period trading session.   
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Table 6. Rate of Separation from Present Trading Partner for Incomplete Contracts
A 
  Self-regarding Buyer  Other-regarding Buyer 








A – We reject the equality of both pairs of numbers within the same row at the one percent level 
using a t-test; we fail to reject the equality of both pairs of numbers within the same column 
using the same test. 
 
Table 7. Subject Index of Self-regarding Preferences by Length of Trading Relationship
A 
Self-regarding Preferences  Same partner:  £ 5 periods   Same Partner: > 5 periods  








A – We reject the equality of both pairs of numbers within the same row at the one percent level 
using a t-test; we fail to reject the equality of both pairs of numbers within the same column 
using the same test. 
 
  Tests of the equivalence of separation rates by the type of social preference held by the buyer 
(short side of the market) are rejected at all reasonable rates of significance (Table 6), however 
the  separation  rates  of  self-regarding  and  other-regarding  second-movers  (sellers)  are  not 
statistically different.  The rate of separation after trades involving an other-regarding principal 
are  only  one-third  that  following  trades  involving  a  self-regarding  principal,  suggesting  that 
employee turnover in this experimental market is tightly tied to the social preferences of the 
principal.   
  Another way to capture this qualitative finding is presented in Table 7, where the average 
index of self-regarding behavior is for buyers and sellers involved in trading relationships with a 
short (five periods or less) or longer (more than five periods) working relationship.  The average   Do Not Cite Without Permission 
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self-regarding  preference  index  for  buyers  and  sellers  involved  in  the  long-term  agreements 
almost half that of those buyers and sellers involved in short-term agreements, suggesting that, 
through time, other-regarding buyers match themselves with other-regarding sellers and develop 
mutually beneficial, long-term working relationships. 
 
Summary and Conclusions   
We begin by summarizing several of our key results. 
1.  Both  principals  and  agents  with  self-regarding  preferences  (the  standard  economic 
assumption) were involved in incomplete contracting transactions that yielded both low 
quality and low surplus (less than half of what is obtained under complete contracts).  In 
addition, these principals earned only 22 percent of what they earned under the complete 
contract.  However, agents earned more than they did under the complete contract. 
2.  Principals with other-regarding preferences were involved in transactions that  yielded 
quality-surplus outcomes that were nearly identical to what was obtained under complete 
contracts.  In addition, the surplus is distributed nearly equally between principals and 
agents. 
3.  Agents with other-regarding preferences produced higher quality than agents with self-
regarding preferences, though they did not earn more rent. 
4.  Principals  who  contracted  with  agents  with  self-regarding  preferences  generated  low 
quality and low surplus (about half of what is obtained under complete contracts).  In 
addition, the principal obtained only one-third of the surplus.   Do Not Cite Without Permission 
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5.  Principals who contracted with agents with other-regarding preferences generated quality 
and surplus that exceeded levels obtained under incomplete contracts with agents with 
self-regarding preferences. 
6.  The average index of self-regarding preferences for principals and agents involved in 
long-term  relationships  (>5  periods)  is  much  lower  than  the  index  of  principals  and 
agents that were involved in short-term relations (￿5 periods).  Furthermore, principals 
with high degree of self-regarding preferences featured a higher separation rate than those 
with other-regarding preferences, though the same did not hold true for agents.  Thus, it 
appears that selfish principals had more difficulty cooperating with agents and that other-
regarding principals and other-regarding agents tended to ‘find each other’ through the 
matching process of trading through rounds.  
  The  main  implication  of  our  findings  is  that  social  preferences  appear  to  be  extremely 
important in settings like incomplete contracts, where social norms such as trust and cooperation 
are important.  We find that subjects with certain types of social preferences are better equipped 
to establish these norms in trading relationships, which can lead to highly efficient outcomes 
even under incomplete contracts.  In addition, government intervention, such as the introduction 
of third-party enforceability of performance, which makes contracts more “complete”, can be 
efficiency and surplus enhancing in the aggregate, but may cause different impacts by social 
preference class.  Furthermore, if we believe that real-world markets retain the feature that other-
regarding sellers and buyers find one another through trial and error in a relational contracting 
market  and  that  these  relationships  generate  similar  social  surplus  as  complete  contracting 
scenarios, then it suggests that costly regulations aimed at making contracting markets more   Do Not Cite Without Permission 
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‘complete’ may be ill advised but that regulations that facilitate reputation development and 
matching of agents with suitable reputation could enhance market efficiency.  
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